JACK KEMP
ORAL HISTORY PROJECT

Interview with

EDWIN J. "ED" FEULNER, Ph.D.

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Interviewer

Morton Kondracke

JACK KEMP FOUNDATION
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Morton Kondracke: This is a Jack Kemp oral history project interview with Dr. Ed Feulner, president of the Heritage Foundation. Today is April 12, 2012. We're at the Heritage Foundation headquarters in Washington, DC and I'm Morton Kondracke. Thank you, Ed, for doing this. When you think about Jack Kemp, what immediately comes to mind?

Ed Feulner: Optimism, vigor, full speed ahead, enthusiasm.

Kondracke: I know that you have many, many, many experiences with him over a long period of time, but are certain personal experiences with him outstanding and leap to mind immediately?

Feulner: Gosh, there are so many, Morton. A little personal background, pre-Jack Kemp. I came to town in '65, worked as a public affairs fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The second phase of that three-year fellowship was to be in effect as an intern on Capitol Hill but still paid by them. So it came time to decide who I would spend the second phase with and I had a choice between the three people we narrowed it down to, Everett [M.] Dirksen, my home-state senator or two rising congressmen, [Melvin R.] Mel Laird and [Donald H.] Don Rumsfeld. And Don Rumsfeld, one of his key interests at the time was Latin America, about which I was less than enthused. Mel Laird was chairman of the Republican Conference, which, I thought, that would give me a kind of broad overview of what goes on in the Party and all the rest, so anyway, I went with Mel Laird second phase. Next thing I knew I was one of the four political appointees who Mel Laird took with him to the Pentagon. So, 1969, bringing it up to speed, I'm in the Pentagon in the on the C-

ring on the same floor as my sec def [Secretary of Defense] and my title is "confidential assistant to the special assistant to the secretary and deputy secretary," and my main job was looking around and fending off job seekers, basically, who were not qualified for the, I think we had 87 political jobs, and at that time counting men and women in uniform there were three plus million people in the Pentagon. And so every two weeks in the first year of the [Richard M.] Nixon administration I'd go down with everybody from every other department and we'd meet with Harry [S.] Fleming and Peter Flanagan and talk about how we were doing on political appointees in the Nixon administration. And I'll tell you, after about six or eight months that got to be pretty old. I thought to myself, "What I really want to be doing is fighting Communists, not fighting bureaucrats, and not fighting to get an IBM [International Business Machines] typewriter in my office over here with some petty bureaucrat who said because I'm a GS-9 [General Schedule US civil service pay scale] I can't get a typewriter, I can only get a manual or something. So [Philip M.] Phil Crane was elected, actually to succeed Rumsfeld in Illinois. I'd known Phil Crane through the Conservative Movement through the Intercollegiate Studies Institute. He asked me to come over and first be his legislative director and then a year later to be his chief of staff, so by 1970 I was Phil Crane's chief of staff and we were talking about how conservatives could work together more effectively in the House. All of a sudden in the '70 election this bright guy from Buffalo, New York, I kept hearing about was elected, so '71 I'd taken a leave, gone out, managed Crane's reelection campaign in '70, '71 we started talking about "hey, maybe we'll start some kind of a conservative caucus within the Party to keep pressure on the [Robert H.] Bob Michels of the world who were quite willing to be in the permanent

minority. So we started what eventually became the Republican Study Committee, and I started looking around, and yes, we had the establishment types, who were willing to break to a certain extent, like [Edward J.] Ed Derwinski, we had the gun-ho conservatives like John [H.] Rousselot, and of course my own boss, Phil Crane, and everybody kept talking about Kemp. And I went in to see Kemp, made an appointment, and my first meeting with him I'll never forget. I went in, his whole desk was full of a stack of newspaper clips, or whole pages just kind of folded over with something marked and some correspondence, I suppose, for Tilly Smith who didn't get her Social Security check in Buffalo, New York, in the middle, and he had two books on his desk. One was the Bible to keep his moral compass straight, and the other was [Friedrich A.] F.A. Hayek's *Constitution of Liberty,* to keep his economic thinking straight. And I thought, "Man, this is a guy I can work with." Because Phil Crane earned a Ph.D. in American history, was about the only one among all the House Republicans I knew back then who really understood what the whole Conservative Movement was about, what conservative ideas were about. Crane had written a book about the sources of what had happened called *The Democrats' Dilemma*, talked about the influence of the Fabians, went through Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Movement and how that had all developed, and the basic confrontation that was going to be faced. Of course Crane was very active in Illinois in the '64 [Barry M.] Goldwater campaign. I was in graduate school back in Pennsylvania at the time. I didn't know him through that but I did, as I said, know him through ISI [Intercollegiate Studies Institute]. So Crane really understood that but we're talking about Kemp. Kemp, we struck up a friendship and we started talking, and I thought to myself, "Well, Crane's got most of it right, but boy, this guy really

understands what's going on out there in real America in terms of what are conservatives doing to use today's jargon, we're only talking about the one percent. What about the other 99 percent? How do we reach out to blacks?" Well this guy wasn't reaching out to blacks. I mean blacks were as integral to Jack Kemp's whole life as whites were. This would all come back much later. But that first meeting was certainly a provocative one.

Kondracke: Do you remember what you talked about?

Feulner: Talked generally about structures inside the House, how a back-bencher could make a difference. I'd studied at the London School of Economics and become fairly familiar with the parliamentary system and how that might work. And what he could do as a new member, and committee assignments, and of course he eventually did end up on Approps [House Committee on Appropriations] and he mattered. Not that he ever took that too seriously. But it was refreshing to have somebody there. Back then you had guys, [Harold R.] H.R. Gross, Doc Hall [phonetic], Earl [F.] Landgrebe from Indiana, members who basically somebody once described it had fallen asleep on the no button. That was just their visceral reaction. It was never do something positive. And kind of at the other end you had the Bob Michel/[Robert J.] Bob Dole kind of thing where you had the we're going to have balanced budgets and that's the way it's going to be. This was before supply-side really got popular, and before his famous meetings with [Jude T.] Wanniski and [Robert L.] Bob Barkley and, I don't know. You've probably already talked to [Arthur B. "Art"] Laffer. He was kind of looking for what kind of a role he could have. A lot of people recognized him both for—and he and Crane in some respects

were almost rivals. They were both men of ideas. Crane more grounded. Ph.D. from Indiana University, quote, where his academic record had never been excelled. Kemp, bachelor's degree from Occidental, not an intellectually stunning background, but a man well read, and a man, I've forgotten, at one of the Kemp occasions one of his football players said, "When one of the rest of us were reading comic books, Jack Kemp was reading Hayek and [Milton] Friedman." Kind of a self-taught guy too, but always reaching out for ideas and how they mattered. Always wanting to talk about them, and boy, did he talk. The other kind of really memorable experience is '96, August, Republican Convention, San Diego. Linda [C. Leventhal] and I and our two kids [Edwin J. Feulner, III and Emily V. Lown] were in Nantucket on a vacation, and the hotel clerk came running out, we were at the pool, and said, "I've got a very important telephone call for you." I looked at Linda with some foreboding. I didn't know if somebody had died or what had happened. And it was Jack saying he was going to be nominated that night for vice president and would I please take a leave of absence. I gulped and said, "Give your speech and we'll talk about it, but I've got to talk to my board people and see what they say about this." I did, I called my board chairman, and he said, "Well, if it's for two months or something like that we can probably work something out." And I called [Richard M.] Dick Scaife in Pittsburgh, who was my vice chairman of the board, he was not a particularly big Kemp fan, and he was not very enthusiastic, but he said, "Well, as long as you're coming back I guess it's okay." So Linda and I talked about it, prayed over it, and the next day Jack and I had a further conversation. By this time he was the candidate for vice president. I said, "Okay, I'll be with you through the election and we'll see what happens." The office was around the corner up there. Meantime I had

to get the ducks in a row here. Fortunately my right good right arm, [Phillip] Phil Truluck had been with me all the time and he was still here, so he was able to take over. Went up there and found out that Jack's vision for my role as chief of staff and the guy to pull it all together was not quite what Bob Dole's idea was in terms of a staff, so he had his own guys in to try to control Kemp. Wayne [L.] Berman, I don't know if you've ever talked to Wayne, if he's one of your interviewees, and Wayne was sent down from the top floor to make sure there was not too much deviation from what Dole was willing or eager to say. That part of it was a little tense, because I was the true believer being imported at Kemp's specific request, Berman was the team player to make sure that Dole and Kemp were on the same side. Maybe I'm getting ahead of myself, but anyway, during that time, of course, I was on the airplane with him probably half or two-thirds of the time. I said various times, I said, "Jack, you know, we're spending a lot of time in Watts and Harlem and the south side of Chicago, I understand that, but we've also got a base we've got to make some appeals to and we really ought to be, if we're in the south side of Chicago, we ought to stop in DuPage County, which is my home, every once in a while, because if you don't carry DuPage, back then, with 65 or 68 percent, you don't have a shot at carrying Illinois." "No, no, we've got to make sure the people on the south side know that we care about them." I said, "Well, you've proven that. But now let's talk to the base a little bit too." It was—I've characterized it privately in the past—it was one of those experiences of never regret but never repeat, because I don't know how these guys do it. I was with [Willard] Mitt Romney last week. He was up and obviously somebody had given him a little jolt on the way into the meeting. He was vigorous, he sounded good, but just studying him across the table you

could see the guy was—you do this for the last five or six months that he's been doing it, and you just get worn out. It's really, really tough. But Jack was always so up, and ready and raring to go, and the traveling press corps was so bored because it was always basically the same speech, and Feulner was always so nervous because Jack had an early cell phone back then, and whenever the plane would land, the first thing I'd notice would be Jack's on the phone. And I'd say to one of my other buddies, "Oh, my God, I bet he's talking to Wanniski again." And Wanniski had, all of a sudden he, Wanniski, would have been talking to Louis Farrakhan or something, and we'd go into a meeting and Jack Kemp would say something really strange, and I'd say, [laughs] "Oh, now we're really going to be in trouble with headquarters." He's off message. And of course the media would love it. The local media wouldn't quite understand what he was talking about, but the guys who were traveling in the back of the airplane, "Oh, there he goes again." I think he got, he loved the message but he got a little bored with saying the same thing time after time, so he liked to spice it up. There were a lot of other times along the way as he rose up, became chairman of the Republican Conference, then over at HUD [U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development] when I was here and we were working with him on enterprise zones and things like that. The tenth anniversary of Kemp-Roth [bill], which we celebrated across the street at Brasserie, which as you remember, a great little restaurant over there, long since gone, so this would have been '81, I guess.

Kondracke: That was the year of Kemp-Roth, yes.

Feulner: Yes, Kemp-Roth was ’81 so this would have been ’91 when we celebrated the tenth anniversary. I’ve got a picture of that around somewhere. He was just as gung ho and enthused then as ever about the prospects for where we’re going and where the country’s going to be.

Kondracke: I’ll just walk you through a little bit. Between when you first met him and when you came here, you were still a Congressional staffer, he’s a member of Congress, so what was your interaction then?

Feulner: By ’73 we started the Republican Study Committee. I was the first executive director, still on Crane’s payroll, Jack was always involved with the Study Committee, but at the same time, I guess I put this back on his football career, Jack was always a team player. He didn’t really want to ruffle feathers as much as a Crane would, or a John Rousselot or [Charles E.] Chuck Grassley who was then in the House. He wanted to be—one of my phrases nowadays—is ‘an adder and multiplier, not a divider or subtractor,’ in terms of not necessarily wanting to send a position out that was that much further. But what he wanted to do was lead the big pack his way, bring them along to supply-side, whatever. And so during the course of those years, yes, a fair amount of interaction when he was in the House. When did he become chairman of the Conference?

Kondracke: ’81.

Feulner: Yes, okay, by that time we were, well, over here, and that was Kemp-Roth and this was after [William A.] Billy Steiger, and the

early days, supply-side. But he had it down. The Bartleys and again, Wanniski, Art Laffer, [Jeffrey L.] Jeff Bell, [David M.] Dave Smick, some of the guys who were on his staff, [Randal C.] Randy Teague, who I saw last night, guys who understood it and guys who I think helped him. They both helped cover him when he would get a little far out in front in terms of some of his ideas. Again, back then if you were an appropriator in the Congress on the Republican side, it was how do we balance the budget. It wasn't how do we grow the economy. An 18 percent slice of something that big is more than a 25 percent slice of something this big. Then HUD, again, by that time I'm here, we're talking enterprise zones, things like that.

Kondracke: In '74 he comes up with the Job Creation Act. Do you have any idea what got him into tax policy, why he decided to specialize in that?

Feulner: I don't know if it was from his reading, and I don't know, you probably from all the interviews you've done know when he first started interacting with, personally with guys like Friedman, and whether they were an intellectual influence on getting him in that. I don't really remember.

Kondracke: Okay. He did get in trouble with the bulls when he got into tax policy, the Chowder and Marching Society, Mel Laird, other people thought, "You're outside your lane. What are you doing here?"

Feulner: Yes, yes, yes, "You're not on Ways and Means," yes, yes, yes. Those things were pretty serious back then. By that time, Laird was one of the éminence grise in town, playing out at Burning Tree

[Country Club] all the time, and as he once told me in his retirement, if he could save a penny a copy for the *Reader's Digest* he would have more than earned his keep for a very long time, but that's off the subject.

Kondracke: So you get to Heritage in 1977 and then how did you and Kemp connect after that?

Feulner: We stayed in touch. He's in the Rayburn [House Office] Building by that stage, he's moving up, he's getting around the country. [In] '80 you had a couple people who could articulate the conservative message from the Congress, but again, there weren't many of them. Looking around, Goldwater was well past his prime, you had Crane kind of shot himself in the foot because he took out after [Ronald W.] Reagan, ran to the right of Reagan in the '80 primary, which meant Kemp was one of the potentially loyal troopers. I don't remember at what stage he endorsed Reagan, whether it was very early or whatnot, but he was in pretty high demand in terms of a surrogate, in terms of getting around and talking about Kemp-Roth, about the ideas that eventually would become the Reagan tax policy. And he always claimed, I'm sure it was true, that he had that relationship when Reagan was governor in California. Certainly the President talked about what a quarterback and an old actor could do together in one of the more memorable lines late in the Reagan years. Our relationship with him though, in those early days, at Heritage, he was one of our heroes on the Hill, he was one of they guys you could call up and talk to and work with. Lee Edwards might have some thoughts in terms of some of my early correspondence, that sort of thing that I just didn't look at.

Kondracke: His intellectual gang was [Irving] Kristol and Wanniski and Laffer and [Robert] Mundell, and there was kind of an AEI [American Enterprise Institute] located group, and I just wondered how that meshed with your—

Feulner: Yes, we were the scrappy new kids, they were much more the establishment, so you had Stuart [M.] Butler here working on enterprise zones and tax credits, and we were doing stuff here, we were doing, well, early ’80, when we started, when we conceptualized the idea of mandate for leadership, which became the handbook for the Reagan administration we always say our Treasury Department chapter was chaired by Norman [B.] Ture, and Ture talked about if the potential president of the United States, this was the first drafts even before Reagan was the nominee, is going to come up with a significant alteration to tax policy hopefully in the direction of a tax cut, first thing he’d have to do would be to upgrade the position of assistant secretary of tax policy to undersecretary of tax policy so that the undersecretary outranked people in the other departments and therefore was the chairman of the internal working group that would come up with the recommendation. Well, not only did Reagan adopt that policy, but he appointed, well, [Donald T.] Don Regan appointed Norman Ture as the undersecretary for tax policy, and so from our side we were helping put the structure in place that would then enable Reagan to say yes, Kemp-Roth is the way to go. So we were kind of down there at the practical level while Krisol and Mundell, Kristol thinking deep thoughts and editing the magazine and being a senior fellow at AEI and Mundell going on to win a Nobel Prize, were thinking the big thoughts, and

Kemp was, he'd work both sides. And you had guys involved with them at a lower level, again like Jeff Bell, and—

Kondracke: Paul Craig Roberts.

Feulner: Yes. And John [D.] Mueller. Mueller always had some kind of strange ideas about Social Security and things like that. Anyway.

Kondracke: We'll get to that.

Feulner: Yes. So we were kind of a bridge. No, we were very different from AEI, and if he wanted seminal thinking he'd be more likely to be there. But I do remember Jack and Joanne [Kemp] being at our house one time when Hayek was our guest of honor at dinner, and we had 15-18 people there. Kemp was just loving every moment of it.

Kondracke: How did he engage with Hayek?

Feulner: As a student, almost intimidated by the éminence grise because again, he had had his books for so long and I wonder where his—does Jimmy or does somebody have those signed copies of the Hayek volumes and all? Are they at the Library now? I don't know. They'd be kind of neat to find. But he was there to learn, he wasn't there to do intellectual combat, certainly.

Kondracke: Did he ask questions?

Feulner: Yes, yes. I don't remember the flow of the conversation but yes.

Kondracke: Were you a supply-sider?

Feulner: Yes, early on.

Kondracke: Right from the get go.

Feulner: Yes, early on.

Kondracke: Do you know, this is a disputed point, whether Jack Kemp converted Ronald Reagan to Kemp-Roth, or whether Reagan was already on that wavelength but just needed the bill?

Feulner: My colleague Lee Edwards, who's done a couple biographies including a fairly recent one of Reagan, talked about post-gubernatorial, pre-presidential Reagan, visiting with him in Bel Air [California], I think it was, and waiting for the governor to come in and just looking around, and he saw a copy of one of Hayek's, I think it was *Constitutional Liberty*, and he just pulled it off the shelf and he saw all the marginal notes and little question marks and exclamation points in Reagan's hand, and he understood what it was about. I don't think Jack had to do much persuading. Billy Steiger had been around and I don't know at what point Reagan started to embrace it because Reagan made—I don't need to tell you—a full political conversion from his days as a Democrat to the point where he'd become kind of a mainstream Republican and eventually a conservative, and to be a supply-sider on top of that, to leave behind the Bob Michel/Bob Dole

root canal theory of Republican economics, of cut, cut, cut on the spending side or increase taxes à la—as a member of the Bohemian Grove I'm in caveman camp founded by Herbert Hoover, who was never Jack Kemp's favorite figure in Republican lore. The Hoover School, if you will, of economics was not, certainly not Jack's, and was not Ronald Reagan's either when you think about it, from his early days, either in Sacramento or here in Washington.

Kondracke: In 1980 did you go to the convention in Detroit?

Feulner: No.

Kondracke: You weren't part of the whole veep, Kemp for veep?

Feulner: No, I was not.

Kondracke: Let me ask you, how do you compare Jack Kemp, and you started to talk about this a little bit, with other conservatives including yourself in terms of schools of conservatism?

Feulner: Kemp was pro-life from very early, he was strong anti-communist, worked on the Hill in a bipartisan fashion with guys like [Thomas P.] Tom Lantos and people like that on the Democrat side of the aisle. I recount in here—did you read this, by any chance—my cover essay about Kemp? I recount in there a trip that [Francis J.] Frank Shakespeare, have you talked to Frank Shakespeare?

Kondracke: Yes.

Feulner: Good. Frank Shakespeare, Jack Kemp and I took [a trip] to Moscow in 1990 and the three of us were walking through Red Square. All of a sudden Kemp stops and he says, "Well, we've won." I said "What?" He said, "We've won." "How do you know? Why now are you deciding?" He said, "Look. The line at McDonald's is longer than the line at Lenin's tomb." And that actually happened. I could go back and actually find the date on which it happened. I don't know who else claims credit for that little anecdote, but it did. Later on he was involved in the formation of the International Democrat Union. We went to Japan. He flew over and I was already there. I was on some committee. And our daughter Emily was coming over. We tried to take our kids once a year with me on a major foreign trip one at a time just to get them to know the world a little bit. He and Emily ended up as seatmates flying on the long leg eventually to Tokyo or Seoul. He got in and they shared a taxi, and he had to explain in great detail to various people along the way that this was Ed Feulner's daughter that he was traveling with. This was not some young honey who he'd just picked up on the airplane. But Emily told me later, she said, "Dad, that guy never sleeps. He was just so excited about everything. He was talking to me about foreign policy, then he talked to me about economics, and everything." And that was kind of the late Jack Kemp at that stage of the game, full of ideas.

Kondracke: Was he a quote, unquote Movement Conservative? Did the Movement Conservatives regard him as one of them?

Feulner: No. I don't know what he ever said for example about Russell [A.] Kirk, who for those of us who consider ourselves kind of real fusionists would say was certainly one of the legs in terms of

traditional conservative thinking. Yes, you had Hayek on the moral basis of capitalism, you had Friedman as the economic guru even though he obviously differed with Kemp on things like the gold standard. But Jack was not—Phil Crane came out of the conservative movement. Phil Crane had been an ISI student and an ISI professor, whereas Jack Kemp came at it later, kind of picking and choosing his parts of conservatism. Again, strong on national defense and the whole notion of spreading democracy around the world and America's commitment for that. Economics, we've already talked about, but on the social side too. And far, far ahead of his time in terms of recognizing when you read the Declaration and you read the Founders that all men are created equal, that back at a time when Barry Goldwater was opposing the Civil Rights Act of '64 and things like that, Kemp was—I think he was already playing football or he was close to playing football and the teams were back then probably half black, half African-American—he knew what it was like because he saw it happen to his friends in terms of being snubbed or being denied access or whatever, and he taught us all a lot about that. In fact I was talking with John Stossel yesterday about the problems we have here institutionally in terms of hiring really good African-Americans at Heritage. If we have one who's an economist or a publicist or whatever and we keep him for a year, a year and a half, all of a sudden somebody downtown will hire him away for fifteen or twenty thousand dollars a year more. I can't meet it. It will throw my whole salary schedule off here, and what do we do about that? But Jack always wanted the least among us to have the opportunity to get up those first couple rungs on the ladder. And he, as I say he wasn't, I don't think wasn't big on Kirk, but he certainly understood the importance of the private institutions between the government and the

individual, [Edmund] Burke's little platoons. I'm not sure he read it but he understood it viscerally and knew why it was important.

Kondracke: Was he suspect among Movement Conservatives because he was a bleeding heart and also had this outreach to blacks?

Feulner: Yes, he was. And also because I think conservatives in the Movement were kind of willing to say, "Okay, we look at property rights differently." If you're the owner of a hotel and you decide you don't want transgender conventions being held in your ballroom or whatever, you've got that right. We in the Conservative Movement could forgive a Jack Kemp for that, but one of the reasons why there was reluctance, I think, about his bleeding heart, I don't know if others would really talk about it, he was not as critical of anything that the government ever did as most conservatives were. He didn't really worry about, whether he was secretary of HUD, about the waste, fraud and abuse problem, or is that really an effective use—and when he was a House member you couldn't really get him worried about the kind of things that Darrell [E.] Issa is holding hearings on now. That was not his shtick. And for conservatives, once you've got a piece of the government in place, let's at least make sure that it's doing what it's supposed to do and that you don't end up with 11 different women and infant and feeding programs all competing with each other and none of them really doing the job. Jack wouldn't care about that. He wanted to make sure that we had more tax cuts in place and that we weren't cutting the bottom rung out on anybody, and if he thought the twelfth program would probably help another five percent of people in that kind of a category, he probably wouldn't object as much as most

Movement conservatives. That was as much a problem I think to Movement conservatives early on with Kemp, that he wasn't

Kondracke: A Movement conservative would be somebody like Scathe?

Feulner: Yes, Scathe didn't understand Jack. He was a little too frenetic for Scathe. I was present at least once when the two of them were together, and Scathe wanted to talk about a particular issue on national security, I forgot what it was with regard to the Soviet Union. Jack was economic policy for a while, he went off on social issues where he and Scathe, I warned him ahead of time that we stay away from that when we talk to Dick Scaife.

Kondracke: Gays or what?

Feulner: No, no. Scathe still talks about how the woman who founded Planned Parenthood had been a guest at his family home and had been a friend of his mother. Things like that.

Kondracke: Jack doesn't strike me as being one of the warrior conservatives in the sense of "Our job here is to beat the liberals," the Rush [H.] Limbaugh, [Newton L.] Newt Gingrich we're going to capture the majority and all that.

Feulner: No, first of all, when Ed Feulner talks about Washington or talks about politics, whatever the broad demographic is, I split it into three parts, saints, sinners and savables. And the saints you want to reinforce, the savables you want to bring over and the sinners in this

context, a Nancy [P.D.] Pelosi, a Harry [M.] Reid, forget about them. Well, for Jack Kemp there was nobody you'd ever forget about. He was as convinced that he could bring a—back then whoever the Harry Reids and Nancy Pelosis were—along to his way of thinking if he could just talk with them long enough and get them to focus on his thinking that they would have to think his way because he was absolutely right. And he knew he was right, and he just didn't understand why they didn't know he was right. And that wasn't always the highest and best use of his talents or the way I guess most of Washington thinks, but I guess that's what a missionary is all about, that no soul is lost, and to Jack, nobody was.

Kondracke: In the early days of the Reagan Administration, as I'm now reading, there were these intense battles between Treasury and the White House—

Feulner: [David A. "Dave"] Stockman, [James A. "Jim"] Baker—

Kondracke: Stockman, Baker and all those guys. Now were you of counsel to Kemp and all those guys?

Feulner: No. The first year, back then you could do what I'm about to describe. I actually was a dollar a year guy working for [Edwin "Ed"] Meese [III] half-time, and I had an office in the EOB [Executive Office Building] in '81, so I was kind of on the inside down there, and Meese was one of his secret allies. Jack would get frustrated with Ed, because he knew Ed was basically on his side, but to him Ed wasn't moving fast enough, Ed wasn't engaging his issues, particularly on supply-side, as vigorously as Jack wanted. Well, back early '80 North

Carolina primary I think it was in the Raleigh newspaper, is that the *News and Observer*? Reagan did an interview and the reporter asked one of the most interesting questions I've ever heard put to a candidate. He said, "Governor Reagan, if you were in a bind and you had to rely on one person, what one person would you call to help you think through or get out of that bind?" Without any hesitation Ronald Reagan said "Ed Meese." So Kemp, he didn't know that anecdote necessarily, but he understood this really, that Meese was his way to overcome the Stockman bean counting and the Baker-[George H.W.] Bush establishment, [Nicholas F.] Nick Brady kind of thinking of what it was about. I think he was probably uncertain at best about Don Regan because of the Merrill Lynch background and that sort of thing. He loved Ture, so he knew he had an ally there, but he needed somebody inside the White House. Meese had other fish to fry besides economic policy because as counselor for the first three years he was on the National Security Council and there were a lot of things going on in the world, and that occupied a lot of his time, not just supply-side economics. The whole Reagan agenda was kind of Meese's agenda.

Kondracke: I sort of vaguely understand why Stockman converted from being a supply-sider to being a deficit hawk or freak you might even say, but what about Baker, [Richard D. "Dick"] Darman and [David R.] Gergen and Bush? Was it the Bush connection or was it conventional thinking or what was it they wanted to delay tax cuts and then raise taxes, what was the motivation?

Feulner: Well, we could see later on that Gergen was kind of a political weather vane who went whichever way anything happened.

For Baker it was conventional thinking. He'd been, what the hell was he under Ford? Commerce secretary or something?

Kondracke: Assistant secretary.

Feulner: Yes, you know, just an old-line Republican hack. Darman and Stockman were sure that they had everything figured out, and it was their way or the highway, and you'd get these hayseeds in from California like Ed Meese or [William P.] Bill Clark, they don't know what's really going on here in the big city. After all, Darman had this computer-like mind where he could figure anything out, or Stockman did, and Darman was the ultimate maneuverer inside. The other thing about Meese, who was supportive of Kemp but not necessarily as outspoken, as I said, as Kemp wanted, was Meese was for the Conservative Movement in the early, particularly in the first term, the outreach to the Movement for the Reagan White House. And that was fine with Baker and even for [Michael K.] Mike Deaver, because the two of them could put up kind of internal blocks toward the Meese part of the Reagan agenda, which was the Reagan agenda as far as those of us who were Reagan's base were concerned, because Meese would be out talking to a Philadelphia Society meeting in Chicago or a law school somewhere else, and he was really the only one who got out of the bubble at the top level. Stockman was over in the EOB crunching numbers. So they'd get Ed Meese out of town, or they'd be happy that he was out of town, and I remember one time in '81 saying to Ed Meese, "You know, I love you and I'm just so happy to have this opportunity, but you have one fundamental problem." And he said, "What's that? That I don't empty my briefcase?" I said, "Everybody knows that." I said, "No, no, your fundamental problem is that you're

too nice. You won't fight back." And you've got Baker and Deaver in there undercutting what he wanted to do, and by extension, what the Conservative Movement wanted, and therefore by extension what had become Kemp-Roth and the whole notion of a growing economy and how to get ahead on that. And I think it was largely just the conventional wisdom at the time was overwhelming.

Kondracke: What do you understand Reagan and Meese and Baker thought about Kemp? Or said about Kemp?

Feulner: I don't know what they said about him. Publicly, of course, for all of them it was all happy and smiles, because they knew that he was appealing to a base beyond the Beltway. I'd leave Meese out of this because I think Meese and Kemp were kindred spirits, again even if Kemp was more focused than Meese, and even if Kemp, if you're a Meese and you're counselor to the president, you're looking at the paper flow, you're thinking about the next head of state who's coming in, even though you're not in charge of the State Department you've got to think about those things. You've got to think about, "Hey, a week from next Tuesday we've got to have the next draft of the five-year transportation bill in and so that's coming over from some other department. You've got to think about those things. Well, Kemp wasn't thinking about those things. He was thinking cosmic thoughts about how to get America moving again after [James E.] Jimmy Carter and that mess, and he couldn't be bothered with those kinds of details. Well, if you're inside an administration you've got to worry about those details. And in the meantime I'm sure that the Bakers of the world had fairly minimal regard for Jack. After all, he had been the opponent of their chosen leader, George H.W, he had fought him from the right.

They knew where the heart and soul of the Republican Party was, which was to the right of George H.W. And so it's not so much that he was immediately at that point in the early eighties a political threat, it was that somewhere along the line again he might be, which of course he almost was in '88.

Kondracke: Just one last question about all that era. The big surprise I guess to everybody was the recession, that was clearly caused by [Paul A.] Volcker [Jr.]'s crunching down on the money supply, and Kemp understood that, Kemp was yelling about Volcker, and yet Reagan had a love fest with Volcker. Was it Reagan's policy to let Volcker create a recession in order to stamp out inflation?

Feulner: Reagan had a failing that virtually every politician I've known shares, and that is that confrontation is not the way you want to go. You don't want to fire somebody. You find it difficult to even hold them accountable. So whether it was conscious, whether it was again the root canal theory that a Jim Baker was kind of pushing on President Reagan, I don't know. Probably a combination of all of them. But it wasn't Kemp's way of doing things, certainly.

Kondracke: So how long did you spend in the White House?

Feulner: Six months, half-time. Come over here in the afternoon, go down there in the morning.

Kondracke: What about the '86 tax reform, were you involved with Kemp at all in that?

Feulner: '96, that was the big Dole—

Kondracke: '86 was Kemp-Kasten, Bradley-Gephardt, eventually the '86 tax reform which basically closed a lot of loopholes and lowered the top rates.

Feulner: And lowered the rates at the same time. Was I involved with him directly? No. I'm sure we did papers on it here, and the usual caveats—as long as these are permanent, yes, that's the way to go. Simpler, flatter, fairer, and then by the time of the Kemp Commission in '95—

Kondracke: We'll get to that. So, enterprise zones. This was a Heritage idea. How did it get to Kemp?

Feulner: Probably hand-carried by me and then introducing him to Stuart Butler early on, and Stuart's been here now for 26 years, something like that. So it would have been early on in those days, and Stuart always kind of thought outside the box, most of the time very positively except when we came up with the mandate in Massachusetts, which I'm still trying to explain away. I don't remember the specific circumstances, but boy, he reached for it and grabbed it because it was his kind of a big idea that again could, with the stroke of a pen in the form of a bill, really change the way things worked.

Kondracke: Were there any other Heritage ideas that Jack adopted, trumpeted?

Feulner: He wouldn't sit still, in my experience anyway, for talking about the way 15 years later a [James M.] Jim Talent would talk about welfare reform. I don't know if it was a reluctance to get down into the details of it or whether he thought somehow we were basically going counter to his notion of raising everybody up. And I remember trying to explain it to him on different occasions about, "Hey, this is certainly not an anti-black thing. We're not talking about welfare queens driving around in Cadillacs or something like that. We're talking about the [Daniel Patrick] Moynihan notion of reinstating what the integrity of the family is about, and how you rebuild that," and Jack didn't want to be bothered with details on things like that. He wanted cosmic ideas of making sure that nobody under any circumstances would have that bottom rung cut out. "Jack, we don't want to cut bottom rungs out. We want to make sure that the human capital of the United States is built and flourishes. The other thing was, of course, Jack always had a soft spot for unions, probably from his player days, with the [American Football League] Players' Association, and Buffalo was a big union town back then. I don't know if it is anymore but it sure was back then. So when you talk about Movement conservatives, back to your earlier question, that was always a problem with him, because if anything most Movement conservatives tend to be on the management side not on the union side.

Kondracke: How close were you personally to him during the Reagan years?

Feulner: Not very. We'd go out to Bethesda every once in a while for a dinner if he had something, or if Linda and I had something really

special, like Hayek coming to town or something like that. If we had a dinner with, here he is right over your shoulder with Clare Booth Luce at one of our events. But those were, it was later.

Kondracke: So in 1988 during the '88 campaign did you help him, or what was your role?

Feulner: Neutrally sympathetic. I remember an early conversation. "Jack, it's not going to work. Ronald Reagan has decided twice who his heir apparent is going to be, because he's got somebody there who will be a heartbeat away, and to convince the conservatives that somehow an insurgent upstart like you is going to outdo Ronald Reagan's handpicked guy is going to be a very, very hard sell, it's just not going to work." I guess I was a little more practical earlier than he or some of his people, but One of my dreams in my retirement, I'm going to write a book on who might have been, the [William L.] Bill Armstrongs, the [Pierre S.] Pete du Pont [IV]s, the Jack Kemps, the Phil Cranes, Don Rumsfeld, [William P.] Phil Gramm, people who, if timing had been different, would have been at the top. Clearly Kemp would have, somewhere along the line, but it just never quite worked time wise.

Kondracke: Did you ever urge him to run for governor of New York or take on [Jacob K.] Javits for the Senate seat?

Feulner: Not Javits, because Jeff Bell to the contrary, with Clifford [P.] Case, that would have been a fool's errand I thought, in New York, and of course [James L.] Jim Buckley came along, well I guess Buckley was at the same time—

Kondracke: No, it was Alfonse [M.] D'Amato.

Feulner: Yes, because Buckley was what, '70-76, I guess, about the same time that Kemp came. And that was [Charles E.] Charlie Goddell in that three-way race. Al D'Amato to [Charles E.] Chuck Schumer, gee, what might have been. I don't recall ever really—

Kondracke: Why was Jack Kemp underrated as a brain, as a policy maker? Somehow even though he read all these books and he had big ideas and he actually got stuff done he never quite reached the level of gravitas that people associate with presidents, I think. I don't know if you agree, even.

Feulner: No, I do agree. Partly he didn't have the credentials coming in, the way I referred earlier to a Phil Crane. Partly his, yes, his interest in big ideas, but he didn't suffer anybody getting down into the specifics with him. That was not his shtick. Jack, "If we lower marginal rates and we're not doing anything about this particular loophole over here [unclear]. Ah, don't worry about that. Somebody will work those things out." That wasn't a serious legislator, and it might be a man of ideas but a man of ideas is not necessarily the man who will then do the implementation. You know, the old Hayek story about founding the Institute of Economic Affairs in London with Ralph Harris. When Ralph Harris had an Antony Fisher, who put the money up for it, talk to Hayek, and should Antony Fisher run for Parliament? And Hayek said no, start an institution that actually would promote market ideas and competition and the vitality of the free society, and you'll have a lot more impact than you will as a single member of

Parliament. Kemp, when they started Empower America a long time later, the founding dinner downtown, I was seated next to Jeane [J.] Kirkpatrick at the dinner and they asked me to say a few words because they didn't want their people, a lot of whom were Heritage people, to think that this was necessarily going to be competitive to Heritage. I got up and talked for maybe five minutes, I don't know, this is recorded somewhere, I presume, and I said that as far as I was concerned Heritage was very good at developing ideas, and quite good, better than other think tanks, at marketing those ideas, but one of the things we couldn't do was lobbying, and that's where Empower America would fit in, and we're so glad to welcome them to the conservative team and be able to do this sort of thing. And anyway, kind of polite applause. I went back and sat down and Jeane leaned over to me and said, "Thank you. Now I understand what we're supposed to be doing." She and [William J. "Bill"] Bennett and Kemp were the three founders of the thing. [laughs] But Kemp, you know, he kept describing it as a think tank. Well, it wasn't really a think tank. Yes, they had Paul [D.] Ryan and some other very bright kids there with them, but it wasn't really what they were about. You know if we, as Hayek once said, we're second-hand dealers of ideas, they were kind of third-hand, by the time they got it, and they were getting it across the goal line, but it was different than developing them.

Kondracke: This is getting ahead of the game, but what did Empower America actually ever accomplish, anything?

Feulner: It gave a base to some important people for a few critical years when they were in the wilderness. Earlier we had had both Kemp and Bennett here. Before they left, and Jeane, of course, was

down at AEI. Who knows where or how a Ryan or somebody like that would have, I mean, how do you track how that would have happened, how he would have gotten involved or where he would have been along the way. Without being disparaging, or for that matter being quoted in Kondracke's volume, no, they didn't accomplish anything. You know I go back to the founding of this institution, there are two people credited with founding it, Paul [M.] Weyrich and me. Paul Weyrich left after four years, I've been here for 35 years. I think we now have a permanent institution here in Washington. Why did Paul Weyrich leave? I love the guy like a brother, and everybody has fond memories of Paul Weyrich. I guess he left the Wednesday lunch that brings the conservative groups together to talk about things. But you remember he had National Empowerment Television, and that didn't quite work. Now you've got Fox [News Channel] on a much bigger scale that is working, so maybe you could say he was a little ahead of his time on that. He used to train conservatives for campaigns, then Newt came along with GOPAC and probably did it better than Weyrich ever had, so what did he leave? Not much.

Kondracke: After the '88 campaign Kemp didn't have a home and you gave him a home. How did that all come about?

Feulner: Mutual admiration and agreement.

Kondracke: But who called who?

Feulner: I went over to see him to find out, you know, "Where are you going and what are you doing? Come with us, we'll work something out." The first year at least he brought along some

support. He was—and I say this with the utmost affection—he was totally unmanageable. He was retrospectively more in the AEI mold, in a Irving Kristol kind of give me and office and a paycheck and let me do my own thing mold than Heritage, where we sit around and decide, "This is going to be our position and this will be our priority on this particular issue, and we will hammer on this one for x while." Doesn't mean everybody who's working on missile defense is going to be talking about the [Warren E.] Buffett Rule [on tax policy] this week, but it does mean that we have one position on the Buffet Rule, and if we're going to talk about it that's what we're going to talk about. But Jack was never kind of that way. And we did give him a home, and I think it was good for him and it was probably good for us in terms of he had played that critical role, in terms of supply-side and in terms of his role on the Hill. And he was by that time an icon of the mainstream of the Republican Party and he deserved our support and the grassroots support.

Kondracke: But he wasn't here very long. He came, he lit and then he went to HUD, right?

Feulner: Yes, what? A year and a half? Was it that long?

Kondracke: Well, he was still a Congressman until—

Feulner: January of '89?

Kondracke: Yes, January of '89, and he was appointed to HUD in '89 sometime.

Feulner: Was he?

Kondracke: Yes, so he was barely here.

Feulner: So he was over here less than a year?

Kondracke: Yes.

Feulner: I guess it just seemed longer. [laughs]

Kondracke: What was your connection with him during the HUD years?

Feulner: Ideas, like enterprise zones, things like that.

Kondracke: Did you see him a lot?

Feulner: Couple times a year. When he wanted either to get back to his roots or think thoughts outside what his keepers were trying to make him think. And you know the anecdotes. You've heard them from a dozen people, about, you know, the second secretary of State and that sort of thing. Jack wasn't about to be kept down by having a defined portfolio of inner cities and housing, but at the same time on those things he did have deep thoughts and big thoughts.

Kondracke: Let's go to the '96 tax commission [Kemp Commission]. How did it get hatched and how did you two end up being co-chairs?

Feulner: I was vice-chair, he was chair. There was never any question that he was in charge. He picked the people.

Kondracke: But how did it get hatched?

Feulner: Dole and Newt were, they were the—and for Jack this absolutely made sense—this was his issue and he could pull people together. So we had Herman Cain and [John K.] Ken Blackwell, businessman, state politician, as the phrase goes nowadays, "men of color," you had establishment people like Shirley [D.] Peterson, the former IRS [Internal Revenue Service] commissioner. And how to bring us together? Jack managed to do it and to do it with some specificity thanks to Alan Reynolds and [Daniel J.] Dan Mitchell who was then here. Reynolds was over at Cato. They worked on the draft. We brought Brian Tracy and Jack was at first opposed to the notion of Brian Tracy coming in. I said, "Well, what he can do is he can facilitate getting us all together onto the same wavelength." Brian did a very good job. Do you know him?

Kondracke: No. I don't know who he is.

Feulner: He's one of the highest paid, I guess, management gurus out there today. If you Google him he's got, I don't know, 50 books out there, on everything from how you manage to all the rest, and he's on my board of trustees. Jack never questioned that he had a commitment to what we believed in, he just didn't think, again, Kemp assumed that because of his insights on these issues that he could bring everybody together. Well, if you're Shirley Peterson and you're used to reading the Internal Revenue code from your days as

commissioner, you know that it's not that simple, Jack. We've got to worry about these kinds of details. If you're Herman Cain, Godfather's Pizza, you're not worried about that either. You're thinking kind of cosmic thoughts, but you're thinking them a little different than a Jack Kemp is. So how did we get these nine or 10 or 11 people or however many it was together? We did it by this facilitation process. We came out with a unanimous report that actually got some attention. Well, I think it probably helped lay the groundwork with Dole that Kemp could be a team player and that he showed some leadership here.

Kondracke: The bottom line of it was a flat tax, right? Now John Mueller, for example, regards the flat tax recommendation as [Robert E.] Hall-[Alvin] Rabushka [flat tax proposal], as basically a consumption tax, which put large, the whole burden of taxation on labor income as opposed to capital, and that this was not what Kemp believed in in 1986, that there ought to be an equal distribution of taxes. There was a dispute, wasn't there?

Feulner: Yes, there was, but I think Mueller was pretty much the odd man out, that Jeff Bell, [Lewis E.] Lew Lehrman, and most by the mid-nineties most supply-siders would have come down on the side of where we were on the Kemp commission, and that's why I referred earlier to the fact that Mueller was a little bit of an odd man out. He still is in terms of the social safety net and things like that, where he's, I guess, more [G.K.] Chesterton than Chesterton would be if he were alive today.

Kondracke: Did Jack require persuasion? I mean, was there a pull from the Mueller side?

Feulner: Not really. And Reynolds was very, very good in terms of what he did. He's worth talking to.

Kondracke: Oh yes, we will. What other memories of the '96 campaign do you have besides what you've already—

Feulner: My closest counterpart to Bob Dole—kind of an interesting thought going back to it—was Don Rumsfeld, who was kind of a guru brought in from his very successful days at this stage of the game in corporate America by Dole, to make sure that either Dole's handlers or the people in the Party weren't pushing him the wrong way or whatever. And every once in a while Rumsfeld and I, if we were in Washington at the same time, would sit down and have a sandwich together and kind of commiserate with each other because we both knew it was not only an uphill battle but probably an unlikely effort for the way the whole thing was working. My other big memory at the time was Jack would come up with some of the most amazing people to travel on the airplane. If they were his football buddies they'd always be up at the forward table with Jack and we'd be flying from Detroit to Des Moines or wherever we were going, and we'd hear the laughter from up there. Those of us, [David M.] Dave Carney, [Frederick L.] Rick Ahearn, the rest of us in the next cabin back would be snoozing and trying to catch up on our sleep or whatever, except for those legs toward the end, when I ended up with [Mary C. Collins] Bo Derrick as my seatmate, at which time my main concern was sucking my gut in as much as I could. [laughs] And she was pretty good on the stump, I mean she got out and obviously people paid attention, and she made a good little three or four minute speech on

behalf of the team and where we were going. The other memory, it was the sort of thing that Kemp just wouldn't pay attention to, because I guess without disparaging him, as a guy of ideas he never worried about how something happened. He worried about what we were talking about or whatever. To land in Louisville, Kentucky, to be met by the, I guess, then-freshman Senator [Addison M.] Mitch McConnell, or maybe he was a sophomore by that time, on a Saturday at five o'clock, to know that McConnell and the Republican Party of Kentucky had managed to produce 350 people on a Saturday evening, you thought to yourself, "Wow. This is amazing, what can be done out there." There were no Twitters or Facebooks where you could immediately get 500 protesters down to a specific site. But that was not something that ever concerned Jack. Those of us who were with him were kind of amazed and impressed that that sort of thing happened. The other thing was that we spent a whole week before the debate in St. Petersburg with [Albert A. "Al"] Gore [Jr.]. I had been on the plane with Jack for most of the two weeks before that. I had the tapes of the Gore-Quayle debate with me. Time after time when we'd land somewhere, the advance guys would always make sure that there was a video, a VCR thing in Kemp's room. "Jack, tonight we've got to watch that tape." "Oh no, oh no. It's Monday, we've got Monday night football tonight and [Robert D.S.] Bob Novak's going to be up watching the football game with me." "Jack, we've got to watch this tape." We went in, we did the rehearsals for four or five days on the east coast of Florida, I've forgotten if it was Ft. Lauderdale or Palm Beach or somewhere, working with [William] Bill Dal Col back up here and Beldon [H.] Bell who came out of retirement and worked up here, we had gotten [Fergus] Reid Buckley, [William F.] Bill's [Buckley, Jr.] brother who does speech training and that sort of thing.

He had a contract with Dole-Kemp. He sat there. We had Judd [A.] Gregg was our Al Gore. We did a couple mock debates, and I said, "Now Jack, will you listen to what Reid's got to say as he walks you through what you did and didn't do?" And Jack would say, "Okay, okay." So Reid would come up, and Reed would get about three minutes into what had been 20 minutes worth of notes that he'd taken about how Kemp could improve himself, and you could just see Kemp, he was gone, he wasn't thinking about this any more. Linda flew down to wherever it was, Ft. Lauderdale. Linda and I, Jack and Joanne and everybody else flew across the state, we landed in St. Petersburg, big motorcade and everything else. It was just the four of us in the Kemp car. I said, "I'm going to give you these." He said, "Ah, no, come up to the room." So the four of us went up to his suite in the hotel whatever it was and he said, "Okay, put it in." So I put the tape in, and he watched it for about the first six or seven minutes, and you could almost see the blood draining out of his face. He said, "Oh, this guy is good, isn't he?" I said, "Yes, Jack, and the debate's tomorrow night. This guy is good." And there were just the four of us there. And an hour or something later, he only watched, I guess, 15 or 20 minutes of that whole tape and an hour later Linda and I went downstairs to our room and I said, "He just wouldn't take it seriously." His ideas were so good and everybody should want them, and it's impossible for somebody, I mean, "Al Gore's smart. He's got to understand why I'm right. He can't think that his view—directly opposed to mine—is right. And I'll be able to convince him." "Jack, it doesn't work that way." And it was, I don't know if Joanne's ever talked to you about that, but it was a depressing moment for me I'll tell you. And have you ever seen the tape of it?

Kondracke: Yes.

Feulner: I mean, it was not Kemp at his finest moment.

Kondracke: Did he play tennis the whole day of the debate and not prepare?

Feulner: He didn't prepare, and we didn't, we had spent like four days before, as I say, on the other side of the peninsula, and you talk to Judd Gregg and I think he would express the same kind of frustration I did about Kemp's unwillingness to really be serious about how you hone your arguments or how you respond. And again, in that, not only in that context but in any context, if you're talking about saints, sinners and savables, Al Gore was a sinner and you're not going to start out in your first answer in saying "I agree." You don't do that. [laughs] And we had been through that a dozen times, and as soon as he said that, and I'm sitting in the front row with Linda and Joanne's on one side, I'm on the other side, and I didn't want to do any facial or whatever, but it was downhill from there.

Kondracke: Supposedly the Dole people kept Kemp's friends, except for you, off the plane. Is that true?

Feulner: Yes, I don't know if—

Kondracke: Specifically, Wanniski.

Feulner: Oh, yes, yes, yes, Wanniski, yes, yes, jeepers yes. And Dave Carney and Rick Ahearn and the rest of us, if we could have

stolen Kemp's cell phone from him we certainly would have. I mean it was not good.

Kondracke: There was a Farrakhan flap. Oh, I know you've got to go.

Feulner: Yes, we can pick this up again some time if there's anything left.

Kondracke: Is there anything else that you want to say that we haven't covered?

Feulner: Use anything in my introduction in there that you want to to the Kemp thing. One of the points, I've got an introductory essay to Kemp, and then I use a chapter of his from *The American Renaissance*, which as I look at it—I picked it last summer—and it spends too much time on his goofy idea of national referenda, with which I profoundly disagree, but there's also some really good nuggets in there about building the movement and bringing people together that were kind of the heart and soul of what Jack's all about. And that's the way I always remember him and always will. He was an adder and a multiplier, and nobody was beyond the realm of salvation, even Al Gore on that fateful night, and Jack, he was good, he was good for the country, good guy, good friend.

Kondracke: Thank you so much.

Feulner: I'm sorry he left so early.

[end of interview]