

JACK KEMP  
ORAL HISTORY PROJECT

SYMPOSIUM

JACK KEMP AND THE 1988 REPUBLICAN  
PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY

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PANEL 2

THE CAMPAIGN AT THE STATE LEVEL:  
MICHIGAN, NEW HAMPSHIRE, SOUTH CAROLINA,  
AND GEORGIA

JACK KEMP FOUNDATION  
WASHINGTON, DC

Morton Kondracke: This is the second panel of our Jack Kemp Oral History Project session on the 1988 presidential campaign. Would you please just introduce yourselves, say what you did during the campaign and why you got involved with Jack Kemp in the first place. Clark?

Clark Durant: My name is Clark Durant. I got involved in the campaign because Jack and I served on the Republican Party Platform Committee in 1984 down in Dallas. We first met in 1980 in Detroit, and I remember [Andrew L.] Drew Lewis [Jr.] coming up one time and saying, "You guys have got to tone down those issues a little bit." But anyway, I met with Jack after that convention. Jack and Joanne with two guys from Michigan that I was going to try to help raise some money, that was obviously a big topic all the time. But to start early, because Michigan was going to be early. And I got involved because what I loved about Jack—I come from Detroit, and I saw Jack as a Republican who had a vision that reached all people, and I loved that, and that's where I got connected with him. I worked very hard for him in Michigan, took the kids to Iowa. I got some great stories, any time you take kids out on the political road, we got some great TV, great press things. But it was a great time of life. I'm honored and was very pleased to be involved with Jack. Good man.

Russell Paul: I'm Rusty Paul. I was the director of operations, I guess, in the state of Georgia. I got involved with Jack because I had first met Jack at a [Newton L.] Newt Gingrich fundraiser in Atlanta, and it was a transformational experience. You've heard all the conversation about inspiration, and it was beyond that. It was almost a religious transformation for me, because as a young, aspiring

politician, Republicans were kind of against everything when I was starting out. I was wondering why I wanted to become a politician if I was always going to be opposing things. Jack was the first Republican that gave me a positive reason to engage in government, and it truly was transformational. After I left that speech I was a committed disciple.

Henry McMaster: Same thing with me, Henry McMaster, South Carolina. I ended up being the state chairman for the campaign because he called me up and asked me, and I was delighted to do it. But I first met Jack in February of 1987. He came to South Carolina to do a fundraiser, and I was there with my wife Peggy, and he made one of his usual speeches and he talked about master carpenters and mezzo-sopranos and the good shepherd leaving the 99 to go get the one and all that, and it was so inspirational we both thought that he was our man. Of course Peggy fell in love with him and still is. So he called me months later and I eagerly signed up.

Stephen Yiankopolis: I'm Steve Yiankopolis, I was the New Hampshire political director, and 25 years old at the time, and my exposure to Jack was mostly through the media, and I had the opportunity to go to his announcement in New Hampshire, his kickoff in New Hampshire. I started volunteering for the campaign, and pretty much I think I harassed them so much about trying to get a job, and I think I was one of the only people in New Hampshire that may have had a computer. The campaign office didn't have any equipment that they finally relented. I don't know if it's because of my skills or because I had technology. Feeling the passion that Jack had—you heard it from [Ronald W.] Reagan, you heard it from Kemp and you rarely hear that

from anybody else, very few people even to today. It just created a sense of urgency for me to get involved and get involved early and deeply.

Paul Young: I'm Paul Young, I was the New Hampshire campaign director, and prior to joining the campaign I was the executive director of the Republican Party in New Hampshire. I was recruited by Scott [W.] Reed, who was the regional political director for the RNC [Republican National Committee], so I actually kind of unofficially came on board with the campaign before jumping on board officially. I got involved with Jack because I wanted the Reagan Revolution to continue. I knew in my early twenties, coinciding with the Reagan Revolution, I was working in the U.S. Senate and I saw what Bush and the people around Bush were doing to the Reagan Revolution and towards the end of Reagan's administration. I think history has born it out, it was the beginning of the end when Jack didn't win and Bush did. What I would call true compassionate conservatism, and so for me it was an easy choice.

Kondracke: Starting with Paul, what is your most vivid memory of the campaign, or you can have more than one.

Young: I might have a few. I'll keep them short. One is something I've told, I've worked on I think seven presidential campaigns now. What I tell every candidate is this story about Jack, who at the time, he was a football star, he was on the national scene as a leader in the Republican Party, spoke at the '80 Convention, and we were doing one of the first events with all the candidates there in Nashua [New Hampshire], at the Sheraton Tara [Hotel]. I went up to get him in his

room, telling him what's going on as we go down the elevator—there's going to be a bunch of reporters as you turn the corner—and he turned the corner and there was a bank of lights. Back in those days they had the big cameras, the big, burly cameramen, it was just a wall of lights, and he went on and he did his thing, and then afterwards he came up to me and he goes, "I thought I was ready to go. I've got to tell you, I was so nervous when I turned that corner." And it told me about his humility. He didn't have to tell me that. He was on the national stage. It told me a lot about his humanity that he did get nervous. Before that I had known him primarily as someone I saw on TV or read about in the papers. But it also talks about how hard it is to run for president and to get involved, to get in the waters. There are very few people who do it. Jack did a great job at it. Let me tell you one more. I forgot I could do more than one. This goes to the undisciplined nature we heard about a little bit with his conversations. The joke used to be, he'd say, "How did I do?" And I'd say, "Well the first 40 minutes of the introduction was good, but it got a little long after that." We were driving up to Carroll County, New Hampshire, which at the time was the most Republican county in the country. Older population, so I wanted to make sure that he was going to talk about three things: guns, taxes and Social Security. I had an hour and a half with him in the car, and if anybody who's, I'm sure, anybody who's ever spent any time in the car with Jack, he does not like driving in a car. About five minutes into it he's like, "Are we there? Are we there?" You've got bruises down your side. "How much longer, how much longer?" So for an hour and a half in the car I'm telling, "Jack, here's the demographics; here's what we've got to talk about, guns, taxes, Social Security, guns, taxes, Social Security." He's like "Yeah, yeah. I've got it, I've got it." So we go to the event,

it's a packed house, a lot of older people there, and he's about three minutes into the speech he starts invoking the name of a ninth century Jewish philosopher named "Ebekeneezer Golabagolabazee" or something—

Kondracke: [Moses] Maimonides.

Young: Whatever. And I see the faces in the audience going [demonstrates] and I'm just going "Jack." As fortune would have it, a man in the front row had a heart attack, which kind of, "saved by the bell." He ended up being all right in the long run, but that was just one example of how Jack would just, "Tell the guy I'm ready to go. I know I'm right on message" and then five minutes later be talking about something that would come to mind.

Yiankopolis: I think what's interesting listening to the panel before, people talk about the national speeches and the big policy speeches, and the retail politicking is a grind. It's a real grind. And when we had him in state, and of course he was traveling all around the country, he was spending time in Washington, we had him for three or four days at a time, and literally had him scheduled from sun-up to sun-up. Very little sleep. What amazed me was his ability, when he left town, and we had spent virtually every moment with him, I was exhausted. And to think about him going back to Iowa or heading down to South Carolina or going back to Washington and doing it again and again and again. He had an incredible stamina. In between those campaign events that we would have, like Paul talked about, New Hampshire's not a big state but it's all done by driving, and there are frequently times when we were driving an hour or hour and a half

between events, he wasn't idle on those long drives, and there was a great education, if you happened to be the person fortunate enough to be with him, where he would spend that time talking about these policies. So as a young person on staff with him, you learned a lot. One of the biggest I can remember is the stock market crash in 1987, and that education that weekend, it was a continual lecture, which I think lit a passion for me in finance. But he was tenacious in getting his message out, whether it was in a car with one or two people, or if it was in a sea of people. To Paul's point, I think some of the struggles in the campaign were taking that message that is well-delivered in front of an audience in Washington, and bringing it up to Coos County, Berlin, New Hampshire and delivering that same message, to tone that down a little bit, was a bit difficult.

McMaster: Two short ones. The best speech that Jack ever gave in South Carolina was good not because of exactly what he said, but what he did. He always made good speeches and all the things that the first panel was talking about, they were always uplifting and passionate and happy and positive and speaking of the future. But we went to Orangeburg-Wilkerson High School in Orangeburg, most noted around the state for their great football team. And so there were high school students and a lot of people had come in from the town, it's sort of a rural type of area, and Jack was up there talking about all of those same things, and you could tell the students were starting to get kind of low in the chairs and they really weren't paying too much attention. And then at the end of the speech they called up the football team, so they all came up then. Everybody started paying a little bit of attention then. And then they handed Jack the football, because they had autographed a football. So he had the football in his

hands, and the crowd was starting to wake up. And then he told the famous tight end down there to go long, and so the fellow trotted out about 15 or 20 feet, and put his hands up, and Jack said, "No, go long." And so he started moving. And he said, "Run," so he ran and he was headed to the other end of this huge gymnasium. And Jack threw the ball as a perfect spiral, way up in the rafters and landed right in the guy's hands at the other end of this room, and I tell you the place almost exploded. All the students, it looks like the stands collapsed and they came down there. That was the best speech he gave in South Carolina, got the biggest reaction. But one more story. When I first met Jack, it was as I mentioned a while ago, he was coming to a fundraiser, it was for me. I had run for the Senate, the U.S. Senate, and gotten beat in a race with [Ernest F.] Fritz Hollings, and so he was coming down in February of '97 to do a fundraiser. Well we knew that he didn't like to fly in regular planes; he liked jets because he thought they were safer, but the only kind of plane we could get to go get him was a two-engine King Airplane, they're pretty big planes, but they're still propeller-driven planes. So anyway, I got in the plane and went with the two mature, experienced pilots, both with white hair, and we went to then-Washington National Airport to pick up Jack and [James] Strom Thurmond and Arthur Ravenel [Jr.], who'd just been elected to Congress, they were all coming down in the plane. Well Jack didn't want to get in the plane because it wasn't a jet, but finally we got him in the plane, and we were coming back over North Carolina, it was at night, and all of a sudden the plane started bouncing around in the sky, and the right engine starting cutting out. Everybody was thinking "Oh, my goodness." And the pilots were calling down to Raleigh [North Carolina], saying that they were having trouble with the engine and that they were going to have to feather

the engine, and we didn't know what that meant. We found out feather the engine means you turn the engine off. Of course we had two, so turning one off, we still had one. But anyway, Jack Kemp's eyes were about that big, Arthur Ravenel's eyes were about that big, my eyes were that big. The pilots were up there, we could tell they were very nervous. The plane was going down and sputtering and going down, veering to the right, and anyway, I never will forget Strom Thurmond was sitting there, and at the time he was in his eighties, and he put down his *Wall Street Journal*, he looked at all of us and he said, "Boys, there's no point in getting excited. There's not a thing in the world you can do about it." That calmed everybody down except Jack Kemp. And anyway we landed in Raleigh and rented a jet on a credit card and went on to Columbia [South Carolina] to great acclaim by the crowd, who'd been waiting for us for some time. And some of the newspaper people said, "We were listening to the stories as they were coming in as you all landed. "We got the word," they said, "but we decided there wasn't anything to write about because the plane veering to the right with Jack Kemp, Strom Thurmond and Arthur Ravenel in it, that's not news, and if they'd veered to the left that would have been some news." That's when I met Jack Kemp.

Paul: I guess my most vivid memory, Georgia was a Super Tuesday state, and my wife went into labor on primary day, and my daughter was two weeks late, and I'm running between the headquarters and the hospital all night long, and that child's been late every year since. I had the responsibility for advancing on the kickoff in Greenville, South Carolina, Atlanta, Georgia, and Birmingham, Alabama. Jack got to Birmingham and he was giving this stem-winding speech, and he

had this part where he talked about making our country and the world safe for our posterity, except he didn't say "posterity," he said "posterior." And everybody starts laughing and he doesn't understand why everybody found it so funny, and so they explained to him and he said, "Well, I was right! We do need to make it safe for our posterior." So that was from the kickoff, and we had the debate just before Super Tuesday, in Atlanta, and it was an interesting dynamic. There was [George H. W.] Bush and Kemp on one side and there was [Robert J. "Bob"] Dole and [Marion G. "Pat"] Robertson kind of tag-teaming each other during the debate. After we got down in the basement in the [Georgia] World Congress Center, after the debate was over, I'm kind of trailing along, I hear this kerfuffle ahead, and it turned out that Kemp and Dole had encountered each other accidentally in the basement, and Dole was still mad at Bush, because that's when he told Bush "Quit lying about my record," and Dole had shown up with this big computer printout of all of his votes, shoved it up, and anyway, Dole said something to Jack about supporting Bush or being on Bush's side during the debate, and then Jack said something about being tax collector for the welfare state, and it just went downhill from there.

Kondracke: They were shouting at each other?

Paul: They were shouting at each other. So when Dole put Kemp on the ticket, I was the most shocked human being in the world when that happened, because after seeing that sort of incident I thought no, that will never happen.

Durant: Let me give you two or three, Mort. Certainly one vivid memory, Jack came to Michigan a lot, because Michigan had an early date, and I'm very grateful that he was always responsive when needed to come, but I remember one day in which we did an inner-city church, the pastor was a guy named Butler [phonetic]; we did a labor union hall out in Macomb County, and we did a fundraiser at the country club that night. This is what I think is really so remarkable. His message was always consistent to every audience, and every one of those audiences responded in a positive way. And I knew that I was with the right guy, because that's really what it has to be about. I could give you some political things. Let me give you some personal ones, if I could. What I've always appreciated, and did always appreciate Jack, were the little personal things that he did. Everybody's talked about he'd never make that fundraising phone call and whatever, and we've got countless stories of that. But when I would ask him to sign a copy of *Human Action*, or sign some little memorabilia piece and here's the guy's name, he sat there in our living room one time and just started signing all the different kinds of little things that were tailored to that particular donor. So he may not do the phone call, but he did those little things. My wife Susan, we've been married for 38 years, and when you throw the whole family all in on this stuff, it's hardest on her. And twice Jack came by the house and spent time telling Susan about why the campaign was important and what the kids were doing and some of the other things, and I've always been grateful for that, because we went off to New Hampshire, we were in Iowa, we obviously were in Michigan, and some other things, but those little touches were fabulous. And then lastly I do not want to minimize the experience that it was to be on that 1984 platform with him. It was Gingrich and it was [Robert W.] Bob Kasten

[Jr.] and it was [C.] Trent Lott and Bob Kasten were the co-chairs, as I recall, Henry [J.] Hyde was there, and we just had, as I said, it drove Drew Lewis nuts. The gold piece, Drew Lewis came up to me and said, "Don't vote for this." I said, "Drew, I'm voting for this." But it was Jack who was clearly the leader. He wasn't the chairman but he was the leader. And to be a part of that and recognizing the importance of ideas, that has influenced all of the things that I've done in politics since.

Kondracke: How did Kemp decide that he was going to participate in the Michigan caucuses, which were in 1986, in the summer of 1986, two years before the election.

Durant: Right. [E. Spencer] Spence Abraham was then the Party chairman—

Kondracke: National Party Chairman or Michigan?

Durant: No, the state chairman in Michigan. And what they wanted to do was to somehow or other get Michigan to the front of the line. And so they wanted to start a precinct delegate process that would be early, and you're exactly right, '86, and that's why when we met in that hotel in Dallas and I said, "Jack, you know, if you're going to do this, you know you're going to have to play early in Michigan." And I had two guys down there, [Michael T.] Mike Timmus and [Randolph J.] Randy Agle, both of whom committed to help raise some serious money, and he had to get started. And Michigan did it because they wanted to be front and center. [Charles R.] Charlie [Black, Jr.] said in the earlier panel about Robertson surprising everybody, he surprised

us in Michigan too. That really caught us all off-guard. But Michigan got out early because Spence and John [M.] Engler wanted the front row center for Michigan.

Kondracke: Michigan is a pretty big state. What chance did you think Kemp had to win?

Durant: I thought that Jack had a very good chance. There was no question that George Bush was going to get, if you will, the establishment; John Engler was going to be the co-chair. I went to see a state senator over on the west side, a wonderful guy by the name of [Richard] Dick Posthumous, and Dick was a leader in the state Senate, and Dick came on board. Like all of us he heard Jack talk and all that, and Dick came on board and was really much better politically than I was, and he had a much better sense of the ground game, and I was a good fundraiser and could recruit different people. But there was no question that Michigan was going to go early, we thought we would have a chance, particularly when Dick came on board, because Dick was a part of so-called, a little bit of the establishment. So to have Dick coming on board. But Engler, you know, anybody here who knows John, John's a tough operator, and [Peter F.] Pete Secchia, who went on to be the ambassador for Bush to Italy, they ran a tough game. But I think that's a tribute to the respect that they had for the threat that Jack could be. Robertson made it difficult because when he did come in, I mean there was nothing, when Charlie was talking about the busloads that were coming to Ames [Iowa], the precinct delegate process in Michigan, you could go and get people filed in these precincts, and you could win with two or three votes. So the Robertson people were able to

mobilize the churches very effectively, and did catch everybody off-guard by it too.

Kondracke: In retrospect do you think it was a strategic error for the whole campaign to have played in Michigan insofar as it was so early?

Durant: We should have raised money in Michigan and not played in Michigan. And if anybody deserves credit for losing Michigan, I'll raise my hand. [laughs]

Kondracke: You spent a lot of time there, and how much money did you have to spend?

Durant: Under the rules we had set up something called the Michigan Opportunity Society, and we raised some pretty good money. We raised easily over a half a million dollars. I remember having a conversation with [Theodore J.] Ted Forstmann one time, because he was raising money in New York, and we were laughing with each other about who was going to out-raise who in some of the stuff that we were doing. But I think for the most part we had the money to try to get things done, but we miscalculated. We miscalculated. I'll take full responsibility.

Kondracke: What kind of an operation did Bush have? Did Bush just overwhelm you with organization or—

Durant: Well he had the traditional operatives of the Republican Party in Michigan. So even though Spence was neutral, he and John Engler had grown up in politics together, they had a number of the legislators

who were part of the, if you will, the traditional Party at the time. So they did have the, if you will, the traditional, established organizations in the counties, which would mean these county conventions that would have to run up against Bush and their people. But as I say, I think it's a tribute to the respect that they had for Jack and what he represented that they really did have to do a full-court press.

Kondracke: Did you come to Washington and tell Jack and Charlie and the others, "This is something we really ought to do"? Was it easy to get Jack to commit to Michigan?

Durant: The short answer to that is, I think, yes, at least I don't know all the conversations, but from my standpoint and because every time that I would call or come down, Sharon Zelaska and the others would always get it on Jack's calendar. "Okay, we've got to do some more in Michigan." And so I think clearly we made, I think, a good case, that we could do well in Michigan, and quite frankly, but for the Robertson thing, who knows how it could have actually played out, because all of those delegates would have been for Jack. I think in the last panel it was Mona [Charen] or someone said that Jack had a wonderful way of combining the economic conservative and the social conservative in a very powerful way, and all of those delegates, and precinct delegates, would have been Jack's people. We had a big thing where Henry Hyde and [John V.] Vin Weber, [Robert S.] Bob Walker, Trent, and some other guys all came out to Michigan recruiting precinct delegates. That's an enormous commitment to get these guys showing up in these little county conventions or in these little precinct halls, if you will, to recruit delegates. But they were there and it was really, again it was so interesting. We had this meeting, we got some of the old

Detroit Lions [National Football League team]. Remember Jack was first drafted by the Detroit Lions. [Joseph P.] Joe Schmidt, Terry [A.] Barr and some others all came, and we had this meeting in Detroit. Jack always saw that as a sort of base, and then we sent everybody out across the Thumb over certain recruitment weekends. The effort was there, and it was a great time, frankly.

Kondracke: In those caucuses in '86, the result was Bush, 40; Robertson, 9; Kemp, 9. You really got skunked.

Durant: Hey, I raised my hand. Do you want me to raise both of them? Do you want me to lie down and—

Kondracke: What effect did that have down the line, that Michigan defeat, right off the bat? Was it a psychological blow to your efforts in New Hampshire?

Young: I have to be honest. I think it had very little effect in New Hampshire. Iowa, another story, I'm sure we'll get into that.

Kondracke: Just to let Clark off the hook a little bit here, ultimately, you ended up getting almost as many delegates out of Michigan as Bush did. Now how did that come about?

Durant: That came about because at the end, I think, everybody was worried in a general election what it would mean to have Pat Robertson as the nominee, and a number of the Bush people were concerned about that who were really, had they not had personal loyalties to Spence or John or whatever probably would have been

Kemp people. And so a number of those delegates became Kemp delegates. There were some other grassroots ones. We made some agreements with people and so that Jack would be getting more delegates, because that's where a lot of people's hearts were, frankly. That's really what it was.

Kondracke: And supposedly there was some rancor between Kemp and Robertson as a result of that.

Durant: Those negative things that Charlie was talking about, the radio pieces in Iowa, there's no question that the Robertson people did that in Michigan as well.

Kondracke: Like what?

Durant: In a curious way it was mostly on the right to life issue. And what angered, not angered, because I don't get angry, but what really disappointed me about it is I was in all sorts of different places where Jack, not waiting for a question, it was a part of the fabric of what he talked about. I mean he talked about it constantly. And then to have, frankly, have the Robertson people spreading this, that he really wasn't there. I sat there, I heard it. I heard it time and time again. And that really did cause some serious division within the Party, long after the primary, by the way.

Kondracke: Obviously Iowa had a big impact on New Hampshire, right? So describe how that came about.

Young: Things were going very well for us in New Hampshire. We had an extremely strong grassroots organization. I think it was mentioned on the earlier panel, we had to by necessity, we had Steve and I were the only staff people for a long, long time, until we had one or two others join us toward the end. So we had great county organization, we had, I think ultimately six of 10 of the Republican county chairmen had left their post to join the campaign, we had the gun owners groups behind us, the leaders of that organization; the pro-life people behind us. We had a really strong—as I mentioned I’ve done seven presidential campaigns. It’s as strong a grassroots organization as I’ve ever seen on a campaign. And I think it was because of Jack’s message, and the Reagan conservatives rallying around him. So things were going well, and it was mentioned earlier, we were climbing in the polls. Just prior to Iowa we were neck and neck with Dole. You could feel the momentum. I was convinced, absent Iowa, we were going to come in second, even maybe a very close second to Bush. I think we had a lot of momentum surging up. And then we didn’t do too well in Iowa. Robertson was not as big a factor in New Hampshire as he was, obviously, in other states, and we knew that, so we weren’t that concerned about him in New Hampshire. Iowa we came in, Charlie Black mentioned that the media wrote us off after Iowa, and I’ve been telling people for years, I could have had Jack walk naked down the streets of Manchester after Iowa, and not one reporter would show up. It was brutal. It was as brutal a couple of weeks or 10 days in politics as I’ve ever had. You have Jack in there and the media just stopped covering him. And it was frustrating. The polls and the ultimate results, we ended up with 13 percent, showed that. So I learned a lesson on how important it is to at least show in Iowa as you’re coming in to New Hampshire. Nowadays it’s a little different,

the dynamic is a little different nowadays, because you have other avenues to reach people. Back then the national media was so important to determine who was going to be the next president. Now you've got social media and other avenues to go out and reach voters, and I think you're seeing that in this election, with a lot of flipping around of people in the lead. Back then you couldn't do it. If the national media wrote you off, forget about it.

Kondracke: What did the *Manchester Union Leader* do?

Young: In terms of post-Iowa?

Kondracke: Well, yes. About the Kemp campaign. Who did they endorse?

Young: *Union Leader* ended up endorsing [Pierre S.] Pete du Pont [IV].

Yiankopolis: We all forgot for a moment. Pete du Pont, yes.

Young: They didn't like Jack. Nackey [S.] Loeb did not like Jack because he wore a tie pin. And she didn't like his loafers, so she thought he wasn't a man of the people or something. I mean, that's what we heard on the streets. I'm sure there was more to it than that, but that came back to us. So they were not impressed with Jack, which was too bad, I think, particularly if it was based on something so superficial, but it would have seemed that they had a natural connection, but they ended up going with du Pont, so in essence their endorsement wasn't that dramatic.

Durant: Truly a man of the people. [laughter]

Young: Yes, exactly.

Kondracke: Did Jack spend a lot of time or maybe too much time fighting du Pont?

Young: I don't know about too much time. You had to be worried about him. The guy had the endorsement of the *Union Leader*. I don't remember us engaging. We had some fun with him; we always made sure there was a Rolls Royce parked in front of his campaign events. We did some fun things along those lines. Our focus was on overcoming Dole, and we were succeeding.

Kondracke: How did you do that? What were you doing to combat Dole?

Young: We were making sure that people understood that he was the tax collector for the rich and all of his votes along those lines, his lack of support for supply-side economics was big. Economics is always the biggest issue in New Hampshire campaigns. In state elections "It's the economy, stupid," particularly in New Hampshire. Jack's message was tailor-made to New Hampshire in terms of tax cuts and keeping government limited, and prosperity for all. That's a very common New Hampshire message. Whereas Dole came across as part of the problem, been in there not making changes to policies, to welfare policies and things like that but just finding new ways to raise taxes to

keep the same old, same old going. And we just pointed that out through our mail, through any type of constituent contact.

Kondracke: Did you have enough money for ads? You had to buy out of Boston, right?

Young: We did. Boston is incredibly expensive. It's always a challenge. But we had enough money for ads. Obviously we didn't run, and I'm sure Charlie could speak to that, I'm guessing they didn't run as much on Boston post-Iowa as they maybe had planned because of the situation, but we did have ads, up until Iowa. After Iowa I didn't even care about advertising because I kind of knew it was over. You can feel it in a campaign, and it happened [snaps fingers] like that. We had tremendous momentum; all of a sudden, within a few days it became very apparent that no one was going to cover us anymore.

Kondracke: Where were you on caucus night in Iowa, and did you know that night that your—

Young: I was still young enough and naïve enough that I didn't know that it was going to be so powerful. I was in my late, what, I was 27, 28 years old. I knew it wasn't good, but I'm figuring "Well, we'll go back at it and we'll fight through it. We still have this momentum; maybe we'll get a setback, we'll come through it." I was disabused of that notion after about maybe 48 hours. It became very clear.

Yiankopolis: The phones stopped ringing. It was noticeable the next day, right after. We walked into the office and it was virtually silent. And it'd always been a very busy activity.

Kondracke: There were 14 members of the Kemp family, including [Thomas P.] Tom Kemp, who came up and barnstormed the state. Talk about that.

Young: It was great to have them up there because you'd get the Kemp name all around, and I know Jennifer [Kemp Andrews] and Judith [Kemp] were up a lot, and [Jeffrey A.] Jeff [Kemp] came up when he could. Jeff was great because he was an NFL [National Football League] player, which had a little different angle to it and you could take him to different venues and he was good at delivering a stump speech. And you guys were, we put you through a lot, I know. When they came up we put them to work, going around meeting people and voters, so it was good to have everybody up there. We had celeb—Chad Everett I remember coming up and a few people like that. All the fun that the New Hampshire primary offers.

Yiankopolis: What was interesting about the family surrogates coming up was they all spoke the same way. You can hear it when you speak to them. They all have that Jack Kemp timbre. But the same passion about, they knew what he was talking about, they knew what he was about. I assume it's from sitting around the dinner table forever and listening to the same thing over and over again. I remember having Jennifer at a Concord [New Hampshire] high school talking to a civics class, I don't know if you recall, but the teacher was getting a little, she was probably from, she was a far-left teacher, and she came right

back at her. So Jennifer was in that same Jack Kemp fashion. So having the family members, I think, was very important. The money was very tight, and we did a lot of very direct mail if I remember correctly. We went into every single town hall and we looked at who had voted in the prior two New Hampshire state primaries, to see who was really going to vote. We were literally counting our stamps to try to have the highest impact, instead of doing a broad mailing to everybody. We tried to focus it. We got our message out in a highly effective manner with the mail that we did, the radio that we did late in the campaign and the selective television that we did.

Kondracke: South Carolina. You get Iowa, New Hampshire, bad news, then Minnesota and South Dakota probably worse news, so by the time it got to South Carolina what was the situation?

McMaster: We weren't feeling too good. The numbers were Iowa: Dole-37, Robertson-25, Bush-19, Kemp-11. New Hampshire was Bush-38, Dole-28, Kemp-13, du Pont-11 and Robertson-9. And we had ours on March 5th, which was a Saturday, and this was the second presidential primary that we'd had. The first being 1980 with Reagan. Was Bush-48, Dole-21, Robertson-19 and Kemp-11. We were scared of Robertson because he'd come out of nowhere. If you add those numbers up in South Carolina, even after the defeats in Iowa and New Hampshire, we'd have between Dole and Bush, and as Clark said, I think that's the way most of those people would have gone. We knew we were in trouble, but Jack was everybody's second choice, and even people who were for the others would say that. Something most people might not know, I know Rusty participated in this, by the time we got to the convention, a number of the states were writing up

petitions among the delegates for vice president. And of all the South Carolina delegates, every one except two had signed a petition to Bush to be the vice president, and those two, and I guess we had about 60—

Kondracke: For Kemp to be vice president.

McMaster: For Kemp to be vice president, and delivered it to Bush. And those two were for him, but for some reason they just didn't want to sign. Back to the primary, and ours is an open primary, it's on Saturday, and between the Robertson factor, which was very big with a lot of new people coming along that nobody had ever seen before, and also Carroll [A.] Campbell [Jr.], whom we elected governor in 1986, he was enormously popular, and he was leading the Bush effort, we knew we had problems. But Jack was upbeat and he was giving those same speeches, and he made a lot of friends, but we knew we weren't going to win it.

Kondracke: At the outset did you actually think that Jack could win it, when you started getting organized?

McMaster: Yes sir!

Kondracke: Even though, well, this was [Harvey L.] Lee Atwater state and Carroll Campbell state. That's a heavy lift to begin with, isn't it?

McMaster: That's a heavy lift, but we probably had the best steering committee, that's what we called it. The activists around the state who had signed up to work, we had over a thousand people, and there

were a lot of names, leaders that went back for many years and highly respected. I don't think we had the money that the other campaigns had, but again that steady drumbeat of not meeting expectations in the states that went ahead of us just really did us in.

Kondracke: That last debate, February 29th, right before, the last debate before South Carolina and Super Tuesday, apparently Jack really did get aggressive. Did you remember that?

McMaster: I don't remember that one, sure don't. I know we were always pleased with his performance in the debates, but he didn't have an edge on him like some of the other fellows did. There were a lot of folks back then, as now, who were looking for some real attacks. I think there's always an underlying current of anger and aggressiveness that people want to see in their candidates, and except for just a few times, Jack just was not made that way and wouldn't do it. It probably cost him some votes.

Kondracke: South Carolina's famously dirty campaigning, sometimes, so was there any of that in this case?

McMaster: There may have been a little bit, but it was nothing like the other times you hear, like in 2000 with [George W.] Bush and [John S.] McCain [III]. Boy, that was something right there. There may have been a little bit, but that didn't cost us anything. It was just those other factors that just ground us down.

Kondracke: Rusty, so Georgia's part of Super Tuesday. Twenty states. How much attention did Georgia get?

Paul: Well if these guys hadn't screwed it up, we'd have been in really good shape. [laughter] I got a phone call on the Saturday night before Super Tuesday from Jack, in South Carolina, and he said, "Look, I'm getting a lot of pressure to get out of the race. What do you think?" I said, "Jack, we've got two days till Super Tuesday. Let us have our bite of the apple." But we all knew by the time South Carolina numbers, if you don't do well in South Carolina you're obviously not going to do well in a state like Georgia, though we had a really good organization. People forget that in the 1980 Republican convention in Detroit, there were 23 Georgia Republican delegates who voted for Kemp for vice president over George Bush, despite the fact that they were big Reagan people, and Reagan was asking them to vote for Bush. So we had a good, strong base of people in the state to work with, and very active, very knowledgeable and experienced campaign activists, but reality was such that when you can't win one of those early primaries, you hit Super Tuesday, people are just kind of writing you off. Even though they like you, they still are going to say, "Well, I'm not going to waste my vote on Jack Kemp because although I like him, it looks like Bush is going to win and so. Bush did unbelievably well in Georgia and pretty much ended the campaign on Super Tuesday.

Kondracke: Yes, he did clean up on Super Tuesday, and in Georgia he won substantially too?

Paul: By 50 percent.

Kondracke: Yes. Right before Super Tuesday there was a story in the *Washington Post* that indicated that Kemp was talking about getting out, so that must have undercut—

Paul: Well it did, and he was quite frank when he called me Saturday night before Super Tuesday, and just asked what I thought. You don't get that kind of phone call from a candidate who's really, where everything's hitting on all eight cylinders, so we knew it, but we had worked hard. I had come up here almost 18 months before and met with the staff and started helping put Georgia together. We'd put a lot of work, had a lot of strong people who had put their reputations and energies on the line, and I didn't want to pull the plug on it before they had a chance to get all the way to the finish line.

Durant: It's sort of interesting listening to all these stories and I would like to make a historical observation. We were all in New Orleans when Bush chose [James Danforth "Dan"] Quayle instead of Jack. I think the course of American history would have been very interesting, because if Jack had been chosen then, I don't think Bush would have lost against [William J. "Bill"] Clinton in that first race. I think Jack would have, if you listen to the passion and every voice, every one of us saw this continuation of the Reagan Revolution, saw this deeper understanding of how this experiment in self-government works, and I think all of us believe that had Jack been chosen as vice president, he would have used his considerable intellect, his energies, to have a vision for the Republican Party that would have made victory by Clinton impossible. And I think it's a sort of a sad thing when you look at the direction that that, and it was probably as so many things are, was personal, probably Bush felt pushed a little bit in ways that

he didn't like. But I think the direction of the country would have been very different had Jack been asked to be vice president then rather than under Dole.

McMaster: I agree with that 100 percent.

Kondracke: Was any of you in the suite when Jack got the word that it wasn't going to be him?

Durant: I heard it from him in a restaurant in New Orleans, I wasn't in the suite.

Paul: I was asleep in New Orleans, and woke up and turned on the television and saw, and I thought "Oooh, bad news."

Kondracke: Final question. What do you think that Jack Kemp's example has to teach the Republican Party today? Clark?

Durant: I would say if Jack said something once, and said it a thousand times, that the Republican Party was the party of Lincoln, and I still believe that to be true. I think that Jack still can teach and should teach and the Party should listen to the attributes of that message, because I think if the Republican Party really was the party of Lincoln and all of its things, we would be a consistent majority party, but it would be much broader. And I think America would change if the African-American community appreciated, as they do, the roots of the Republican Party. Jack was the best person to articulate that, and politics would be very different if that lesson were

really learned in the way I think Jack believed it, lived it, and talked about it.

Paul: The one thing that Jack doesn't get enough credit for is the fact that he single-handedly transformed the Republican Party on economic policy. Before Jack Kemp, it was about the Democrats are spending money, we've got to raise taxes to pay for this spending, and we were in a never-ending upward spiral. He came through and has totally transformed the thought processes of the Republican Party on economic policy that lasts today, and will probably last another generation, because today, you couldn't get a tax increase through a Republican-controlled body if you had an infantry division behind it. He deserves credit for that. He sold it to Ronald Reagan. And Jack's problem in '88 was that by the time he sold Reagan on economic policy, it became Reaganomics, and when Jack ran in '88, it was Republican orthodoxy rather than the unique message that Jack Kemp had, and so Bush could pull from it, Dole could pull from it, du Pont could pull from it, and he was forced a little bit further to the right on economic policy to be able to distinguish himself as a result of transforming the Republican Party on economic policy. And he didn't get credit for it.

McMaster: I think Rusty is exactly right. I think he changed everything, but in the words of the poet, "Of all the words of tongue and pen, the saddest of these, 'what might have been.'" And as Clark said, I just wonder if Jack had been given a bigger stage, that is of the presidency, I just wonder what his impact would have been on the country and on the thinking, because everything he stood for, everything he believed in, everything he said, was positive, uplifting,

inspirational, and dead right in terms of economic theory and other things. In addition to that I want to say, just as a man, those of us who spent time with him and watched the way he did things and the way he spoke about his family and telling us to be leaders and leaders or readers, and all those little things he used to say all the time, in addition to "Keep your hands off of my daughter." [laughter] That's a joke, of course, to all the staff people. He was a phenomenal, phenomenal man.

Yiankopolis: Thinking about the future and what people can learn, and we're hearing echoes of Jack in the first recipient of the [Jack Kemp] Foundation's Leadership Award to Paul Ryan, is there's never a question about where he stood or where he had stood or where he's going to be. And we're seeing today, with some of our candidates, the question about who they are, and there was never a question who Jack Kemp was. Most people could think ahead and you could probably figure out what he was going to say, because he was that strident in his message and unwavering in his thought. So for the Republican leaders in the future, to go back to that, and to not have to apologize for what they believe in, and to believe it and have passion about it and develop it in your core, instead of developing it based on public sentiment.

Young: I would say what the Republican Party can learn, and what the country, frankly, can learn about Jack is unity. He was a unifier. He brought people together of such diverse backgrounds, and he reached out to people of such diverse backgrounds. He cared about people of all colors, creeds, situations in life, and you can tell a lot about a person by their funeral, and at his funeral you saw labor leaders, you

saw people from Cabrini-Green [public housing development] in Chicago, you saw conservative Republicans. We were all Americans at that funeral, and our country needs that badly now, and I think if we look to Jack's example of bringing people together, finding out what we have in common, and working on that, we'd all be better off.

Kondracke: Thank you so much, all of you, and we'll return the first panel back to conclude. Thank you.